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Catholic and Malthusian: the Entrepreneurs of  
Tourcoing in the Nineteenth Century 
Béatrice Craig ∗ 
La pratique religieuse et la foi ne sont pas parvenues à en-
rayer l’évolution démographique qui n’a cessé au cours du 
XIXe et du XXe siècle de comprimer les taux de natalité. 
Cette réduction de la fécondité n’est pas imputable à un dé-
clin des croyances. Une société plus religieuse n’y aurait 
pas échappé.1 (Ariès 1971: 321)  
 
Abstract: The Religion is a factor expected to influence 
demographic behaviour. The Catholic Church’s long stand-
ing opposition to contraception for instance should have 
made it difficult for couples to control the size of their fam-
ily, and they are often assumed to have had larger than av-
erage ones. Since the work of Landes (1976), large families 
reflecting the groups intense Catholicism have been de-
scribed as one of the reasons behind northern France’s rapid 
industrialization in the nineteenth century. A study of the 
demographic behaviour of the industrialists however reveals 
that this socio-economic group limited the size of its de-
scendence in response to economic constraint. Although re-
ligion probably had an impact on their fertility, it did not 
determine it.  
 
Like Aries, demographers and population historians have noted that in the 
nineteenth century, the fertility of practising French Catholics followed the 
same downward trend as the one of the rest of the population, although with a 
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1  “Neither religious practice nor Faith could put an end to the demographic evolution that led 
to a decline in natality rates in the nineteenth and twentieth century. This fertility decline 
was not a consequence of weaker religious convictions. A more religious society would not 
have escaped the trend either.” 
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lag. There were exceptions to this general rule: families which produced priests 
and nuns were one of them. The textile entrepreneurs of the Lille area are often 
described as another such exception. In France, the fertility decline was more 
pronounced among the bourgeoisie, described as « sereinement malthusiens 
dans les mots et dans les faits» (Bardet 1988 : 368)2. But all regional historians 
describe the “patrons du Nord” as fathers of large, and even very large families, 
sometimes including 10 or 12 children. Their attachment to their religion is 
given as a cause for their fertility, and this, in turn would have propelled the 
massive industrialization of the region. All those children had to be established, 
and fathers were determined to provide all their sons with their own business. 
Over the years, religion, fertility and the region’s industrial growth have be-
come inextricably linked in the writing of historians (Fohlen 1956b; Lambert-
Dansette 1954; Landes 1976; Hirsch 1991; Verley 1994; Pouchain 1998; Bonte 
2002; Daumas 2004). But is this image of a very Catholic and very prolific 
industrial class accurate? Its Catholicism has been well demonstrated; its high 
fertility levels and indifference to the sirens of family limitation much less so, 
and if empirical data does not support this second proposition, the link between 
religion and fertility in France may need to be re-evaluated. 
Catholicism and Fecundity. Nature of the Problem 
There is no doubt that the industrialists of the Lille area were massively prac-
ticing Catholics. National studies by Le Goff and Remond (1991), Cholvy and 
Hilaire (2000), and Cholvy (2001) describe the departments of the Nord and 
Pas de Calais and the Lyon area as two of the poles of nineteenth century 
French Catholicism. In both regions, the bourgeoisie, especially the manufac-
turing and industrial middle class played a key role in religious life. In the 
Nord, it was instrumental in the development of an Eglise des Oeuvres (a 
Church emphasizing good work by clerical and lay organizations alike). The 
bourgeoisie of the Nord was not religiously homogeneous. Pierrard’s work on 
the bishopric of Cambrai (1978), and Menager’s on the political life of the 
Nord (1983), both delineate a varied spatial and social geography. The northern 
part of the bishopric and of the department (down to and including Lille) was 
the profoundly Catholic one. A liberal and anti-clerical middle class could be 
found in Lille itself, but it drew its members from the ranks of the petty middle 
class (craftsmen and retailers), of the professions, of the journalists, and from 
immigrants to the area. The merchant traders and factory owners who con-
trolled the textile and food industries were on the other hand solidly Catholic. 
They were the ones who, at the end of the century, belonged to the numerous 
                                                             
2  “Quietly malthusians in words and action.” 
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sociétés civiles (non profit organizations) which were set up to supervise the 
oeuvres3. 
This religious fervour was relatively recent. The Bourgeoisie of the Nord 
came back to the Faith during the July Monarchy (Cholvy 2001:102-105). Its 
return was solidified during the Second Empire thanks to the legalization and 
expansion of Catholic secondary education (in 1863, Catholic secondary 
schools taught almost half the secondary school age boys in the department) 
and to the beginning of a Catholic press. (The conservative Journal de Roubaix 
was started in 1856, and reflected the views of the manufacturers of Roubaix 
and Tourcoing) (Pierrard 1978: 239). After the Second Empire fell, an all en-
compassing Catholic world took shape locally, largely underwritten by the 
area’s manufacturers. The development and expansion of the oeuvres - associa-
tions to promote lay piety, to spread and defend Catholicism, or to pursue so-
cial, educational and welfare goals - date mostly from this period, and their 
number increased as the Third Republic became more and more anti-clerical. 
The first Catholic Committee for the Defence of Religion was founded in Lille 
in 1871; it was an umbrella organization which regrouped a multiplicity of 
organizations with varied and usually very specific aims. This committee, 
urged by the thread manufacturer Philibert Vrau who put up most of the 
money, founded the Catholic Faculties (law, letters, science, medicine and 
theology) between 1875 and 1877. It also organized an annual meeting under 
the name Assemblée générale des catholiques du Nord Pas de Calais from 
1873 onwards (Pierrard 1978: 231, 254-256; 265-66; 274-76; 285). The local 
Catholic press acquired new titles: la Vraie France in 1878 and la Croix du 
Nord in 1889. Almost half the shareholders of the first one were industrialists 
or merchant traders. The second was supported by Vrau’s nephew, Paul Feron-
Vrau (Visse). In 1884, Philibert Vrau’s brother in law, Camille Feron Vrau 
founded the Association catholique des patrons du Nord. This organization 
never had many members, but it acted as a think tanks and organized retreats 
for those who were interested, whether members or not (Talmy 1962). 
An educational system encompassing all levels, a Catholic press, the Catho-
lic committees and other associations, and the Assemblée générales des ca-
tholiques du Nord-pas de Calais all participated in the development of a re-
gional Catholic consciousness. All those institutions supported each other. 
They also contributed to shelter this bourgeoisie inside an all encompassing 
ideological system (Pouchain 1998; Bonte 2002). As regional historian Pierre 
                                                             
3  For instance, the société civile des oeuvres paroissiales de St Christophe de Tourcoing, 
founded in 1886, was made of 5 spinners, a manufacturer, an architect and a landowner. 
The société civile du Sacré Coeur de Tourcoing (youth club, school, sewing circle, crèches 
and other catholic activities promoting charity, benevolence, labour and prayers) was 
founded two years later and included four landowners, four spinners, a merchant trader and 
a white collar worker. The société civile de l'orphelinat Saint Vincent de Paul de Tourcoing 
(1893) was made of a landowner, a spinner, an architect, a merchant trader, an industrial 
dyer and two industrialists.. 
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Pouchain stated « Les grands collèges catholiques de la région lilloise com-
mencèrent à forger vers 1840, de nouvelles générations d’entrepreneurs dont ils 
amplifiaient s’il était possible, les convictions religieuses et les réflexes so-
ciaux. » 4 (Pouchain 1998:118). 
Young men were graduating from those colleges or from the Catholic uni-
versity very ill equipped not to believe, and very well equipped to counter the 
arguments of liberals and non believers (apologetic was taught in secondary 
schools). Moreover, this vision of a world divided between Catholics and the 
rest was shared by almost every member of their family and social networks, 
and to reject the one was tantamount to rejecting the others. The Roubaix in-
dustrialist Alfred Motte, although a good Catholic, learned this at his expense. 
In 1877, he ran for office on a Republican ticket, and his family acted in con-
cert to make him loose the election, not without telling him along the way he 
had signed a pact with the Devil (Pouchain 1998: 109; Hirsch 1991: 72, 80). 
The entrepreneurs of the Lille area were committed Catholic. Were they 
really prolific? This latter image has been derived mostly from anecdotic 
sources such as family histories and the genealogies published in the Annuaire 
des familles, and from the calculations done by Bonnie Smith in the appendix 
of her book on the Middle class women of Lille (Smith 1989: 181-82). Her 
work has been the only attempt at quantifying the phenomenon. She drew a 
corpus of families from published genealogies, and concluded that the average 
family size among the bourgeoisie had gone from 5 children at the beginning of 
the century to 7 at the end. Unfortunately, she miscalculated the number of 
children born to one of her cohorts; the average number of children did not 
change through the century; it went up only among couples married at the 
beginning of the twentieth, but only to 6.2 (as opposed to 5.3 in the nineteenth 
century). Smith also did not distinguish between complete and incomplete 
families (the latter being the ones where husband or wife died before the 
woman’s 45th birthday), and a decline in adult mortality could be behind the 
increase in the number of children, rather than an increase in fertility. 
Two other studies should further incite us to be cautious. The first one is 
Codaccioni’s work of the wealth of the Lille bourgeoisie in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century (Codaccioni 1976). Codaccioni used post mortem estate 
settlement figures, distributed by socio-economic categories, and then by 
wealth levels. He identifies those who left estates worth a million francs or 
more by names, as well as their heirs. Those people who left the biggest for-
tunes had very few children. The second work is a demographic study of the 
town of Roubaix in the eighteenth and nineteenth century using reconstitutions 
of a sample of families (Pétillon 1996 and 2006). Among the middle class 
(crafts, trade, white collar workers, civil servants) the number of children 
dropped from 5 to 2.7 between 1820 and 1889; among the elite (entrepreneurs, 
                                                             
4  “In the 1840s, the main Catholic colleges of the Lille area began to shape a generation of 
entrepreneurs, and amplified their religious belief and social reflexes ».  
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landlords, professions), it dropped from 5.5 to 2.5 in the middle of the century, 
and then rose again to 3.5. Roubaix entrepreneurial families were therefore not 
very large, but the sample upon which this study is based is rather small (about 
20 entrepreneurial families for the entire century). Were the families in those 
two studies anomalies? Or did the entrepreneurs of the region really have less 
and less children?  
Tourcoing in the nineteenth century  
We are going to try to answer this question using the textile entrepreneurs of 
Tourcoing as a case study. Tourcoing is one of the four cities of the arron-
dissement de Lille (Lille, Roubaix and Armentières being the others). It is 
located 15 km to the north east of Lille, the head town of the department since 
the French revolution, and 3.5 km north of Roubaix. It had been a textile pro-
duction centre since the middle ages when it was annexed to France in 1668. 
Production was proto-industrial till the late eighteenth century. In 1789, out-
putters tried to escape the crisis which had recently struck the woollen industry 
by switching to cotton. They acquired Jennies (called here “little English ma-
chines”) as early as 1790. The mule jenny appeared some ten years afterwards. 
Machine spinning was an indirect beneficiary of the Revolution. The closing of 
the convents and the confiscations of aristocratic country houses put on the 
market buildings large enough to accommodate mechanized workshops. On the 
whole, however, the Revolution had a negative impact on the local economy, 
and delayed economic recovery till after the fall of Napoleon in 1815. Cotton 
domination did not last. The economic crisis of the late 1820s convinced many 
spinners to abandon cotton and come back to wool, or to work both fibres. This 
allowed the mechanical spinning of wool to be profitable, and had machine 
spinning had definitively replaced hand spinning by 1846. The first steam 
engine was introduced in 1821; its adoption encouraged mergers and concen-
trations and spinning mills began to grow in size. In 1823, the average mill 
numbered 1853 spindles; in 1833, 2243 (AMTg, 7FIC/14; Fohlen 1956b; Cha-
nut 1956; Toulemonde, 1966a and b; Lottin 1986; Delsalle 1985; Daviet 1987). 
Manual wool combing disappeared rapidly in the wake of the 1845-48 eco-
nomic crises, and the introduction of wool combing machines in 1852. Hand 
weaving held out longer. In 1830, all weavers, except those who manufactured 
carpets, worked at home on handloom. Merchant manufacturers were all out-
putters. Mechanical weaving did not become common till the 1860s. Contrary 
to what occurred in spinning and wool combing, the machines did not immedi-
ately displace the hand workers. In 1882, there were 1289 carpet weaving 
looms, 1464 hand looms, 300 mechanical looms, and 2407 unspecified looms 
in Tourcoing. Hand weaving however declined rapidly after 1880, and had 
almost entirely disappeared by the twentieth century (AMTg, G1C33). 
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In the meantime, the mills were growing larger and larger, and increasing in 
complexity. Either they added preparatory processes like carding and combing, 
or finishing ones, like twisting to spinning. Or, they integrated various phases 
of production (spinning and weaving for instance). Cotton mills went from 12 
750 spindles in 1882 to 27 090 in 1901, and 7 440 to 15 300 for wool in the 
same period). However, the world of the highly skilled workers, small scale 
merchants and retailers which had produced spinners and manufacturers a 
generation earlier had not disappeared. Among them were emerging a new 
breed of small scale textile entrepreneurs, usually engaged in preparatory or 
finishing work, probably as subcontractors. Many carried out these activities 
alongside a more traditional one (tavern keeping for instance), and some man-
aged to permanently integrate the ranks of the industrialists, like some of their 
colleagues a generation earlier. Merchant trading also evolved. A the beginning 
of the century, the merchant trader (négociant) had bought and purchased a 
wide range of products for his own account; at the end of the century, he was 
joined by a fast growing number of brokerage firms and commission traders. 
Two consequences of this evolution are important for us. On the one hand, 
at the beginning of the century textile entrepreneurs were all merchant traders 
or out-putters (or both); they orchestrated the productive activities of others, 
but did not directly supervise them, and they found regional, national or export 
markets for the finished products. At the end of the century, they had become 
industrialists, who owned factories, organized production, managed the labour 
force and may entrust the marketing of their products to firms specializing in 
this kind of activity. In addition, the amount of financial capital required to 
become, or remain, a manufacturer was constantly increasing. This was re-
flected in the value of the assets brides and grooms from manufacturing fami-
lies brought into marriage, which increased considerably. The median value, 
which had been 3 000 Fr for those marrying between 1820 and 1829, jumped to 
20 0000 Fr for those marrying between 1859 and 18685. Enrichment could have 
had an impact on the demographic behaviour of this group. 
The method 
This study relies on the one hand on the calculation of the fertility of two co-
horts of couples belonging to entrepreneurial Tourcoing families, and on the 
                                                             
5  Even before the Revolution, community of property was the norm in the area. At marriage, 
the spouses could be provided with a “dowry” by their parents. Although the term “dowry” 
is used, those settlements were in fact advances on the individual’s inheritance. “Dowries” 
and property a spouse may have acquired through his or her own efforts were rarely put in 
the common pot. The community was limited to assets acquired after marriage (commun-
auté réduite aux acquêts). The values have been calculated from the ones reported in the 
marriage contracts. Assets in the form of real estate are also exceedingly rare. 
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other on an analysis of the composition of the entrepreneurial families found in 
the 1881 and 1911 census enumerators’ books. 
The two cohorts are made of couples including at least one spouse belong-
ing to a Tourcoing entrepreneurial family, who married between 1820 and 
1829, and between 1859 and 1868, who continued residing in Tourcoing after 
their marriage, and who were entrepreneurs for at least part of their married life 
(some people failed and never regained their footing). The 1820-29 period was 
chosen because it corresponds to the post-Napoleonic period recovery. The 
second is made of couple whose reproductive life ended before the Civil regis-
ters of Births, Marriages and Deaths cease to be accessible (only civil records 
100 years or more are accessible). The couples forming the two cohorts were 
identified from two sources. First, the Tourcoing record of marriage (in France, 
only civil marriages are legal; people who want a religious ceremony must first 
get married at the town hall). The civil records were supplemented by the regis-
try of marriage contracts (the law also required marriage contracts, if there 
were any, to be registered) (AND 3Q538-2 and -5). Unfortunately, after 1865, 
they are not registered separately, but lumped together with every other civil 
document that must legally be registered, which makes finding them very diffi-
cult. The marriage contract registry provides additional information: type of 
matrimonial regime, value of property brought into marriage. They also allow 
us to identify men who married a non Tourcoing resident, and then brought her 
home: marriages were customarily celebrated in the bride’s place of residence. 
The occupation of the bride, groom or their parents at the time of marriage 
determined whether they belonged to entrepreneurial families Occupations are 
one of the information systematically included in the marriage acts; people 
without an occupation are listed as “sans profession” – without occupation. 
This collecting yielded 127 couples in the first cohort, and 166 in the second 
one. 
Next, the list of couples was compared with a series of other sources: the 
business tax rolls (matrices de patentes), the partnership registration books at 
the Tribunal de commerce (Business Court – partnership registration was also 
required by law); two series of city directories, starting in 1829 (l’Almanach du 
commerce, des arts et métiers des villes de Lille, Armentières, Roubaix et 
Tourcoing de Vanackère 1829-55 and Annuaire de l’arrondissement de Lille de 
Ravet-Anceau 1852-1914), the population table for 1820-1836; and the cen-
suses of 1851 and 1881. The comparison makes it possible to identify the cou-
ples who married in Tourcoing but never lived there (N= 15 and 28). In almost 
all the cases, those were couples involving a Tourcoing bride, and a groom 
from the outside. A few couples left after a short residence in Tourcoing. In the 
first cohort, two couples left after the birth of their first child, and one after the 
birth of two children. Such departures are more numerous in the second cohort 
(N=13). It seems that during the Second Empire, couples who did not do well 
in their business were less willing to stay in Tourcoing. For instance, Fleurisse 
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Duvillier, an iron smelter, became a coal merchant and then disappeared. Much 
later, a marginal note in two of his children’s birth records indicates they mar-
ried in Paris. Perhaps he found a position as manager of some iron works there. 
Others may have used business as stepping stone. Gustave Brunet was a clerc 
de notaire (an assistant lawyer) when he married. He became a merchant trader 
immediately afterwards. A few years later, he was a notaire in one of the sur-
rounding market town. As one had to buy a notaire’s practice, his foray into 
business may not have been intended to be permanent, but to last long enough 
to raise the necessary funds. The comparison between the two lists and the 
other sources also makes it possible to identify couples, who although from 
entrepreneurial families, were never entrepreneurs themselves. They have been 
eliminated too (N= 21 and 12). Those belonging to the first cohort became 
master craftsmen or professionals; in the second cohort, they became civil 
servants, professionals, or landlords. Finally, the couples involving a remarry-
ing widow were also eliminated (N= 3 and 7). The cohorts now include 83 and 
104 couples. 
The second step consists in finding all the births relative to those couples in 
the civil registry (Births had to be registered at the town hall within three days). 
This could at first look like an impossible task. In such a densely populated 
region as the arrondissement de Lille, can one assume that couples spent their 
entire life in a single town? Shouldn’t we comb the civil records of all the 
neighbouring towns as well? Fortunately, no, as this socio-economic group was 
particularly unwilling to move. Regional historians have noted that the bour-
geoisie of the arrondissement was highly socially and geographically seg-
mented, as well as endogamous, and the sources used here do not give them the 
lie6. Those people married each other, and once married took root somewhere. 
The region was a mosaic of micro societies whose social horizons were rather 
limited. The 1820-36 population table allows us to follow couples over a rather 
long period. In 1820, there were 234 households headed by an entrepreneur. 
Slightly less than 10% left in the next 16 years (N=22 or 9.4%, including 4 who 
were not native of Tourcoing). None of those couples belong to our cohort. 
Eleven households included at least one child born outside Tourcoing (4.7%), 
and in only 6 cases (2.6%) the father was Tourcoing born. In 1911, according 
to the census, not much had changed. Very few couples including at least one 
Tourcoing born head had a child born outside the town (less than 10% of the 
couples and less than 10% of the children). When both spouses were Tourcoing 
                                                             
6  Lambert-Dansette (1954 : 720) characterized Armentières in the nineteenth century in those 
terms : « La vie de société, le train familial, les distractions, presque toute la vie sociale de 
la famille patronale était au siècle dernier axée sur un sens profond de la cité. L’existence se 
déroulait essentiellement et avant tout dans les limites de la ville » (Social life, family acti-
vities, entertainments, almost the entire social life of the family were in the last century cen-
tered on a deep identification with the city. Life unfolded primarily and preferably within 
the town’s boundaries). This identification with the town obviously also characterized 
Tourcoing. 
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born, the percentages dropped to 2.3% of the couples and less than 1% of the 
children. Couples therefore moved very little, and the risks of not finding all 
the births using only the Tourcoing civil register are very low. The overall 
margin of errors is small and not likely to affect results. 
A closer examination of the two cohorts is reassuring. Only two couples 
from the first cohort have more children in the census or in the genealogies 
than in our birth data (they have been eliminated). And we know the date at 
which the first spouse died for all the couples except three. In two cases, it is 
unlikely any birth was overlooked, as they had 12 and 14 children, at predict-
able intervals. The last one was found in the population table till 1836 and in 
the 1840 tax rolls. At that date, his wife was 46. 
The data for the second cohort is almost as good. Only four families have 
more children in the genealogies or census than in our data (also eliminated). 
The date of the end of marriage through the death of one of the spouse is 
known in 63 out of the 102 remaining couples. The problem of course, is that 
the post-1904 registers were not available when the data was collected for this 
study, and lots of people died after that date. However, what we really need to 
know is not when people died, but whether both spouses were still alive when 
the wife celebrated her 45 birthday. We can use the 1881 and 1911 census for 
this purpose. They allow us to determine that 21 additional families were in-
deed complete families. In 12 cases, this is corroborated by the genealogies in 
the Annuaire des familles. The Annuaire also provide death dates for an addi-
tional 5 couples, who were too young in 1881, and are not found in the 1911 
census. As for the remaining couples, they include a Tourcoing born male head 
(therefore they were not very mobile), and are found in the tax rolls till the end 
of the century. One can therefore assume without too many risks of errors that 
those couples spent their entire life in Tourcoing, and that all their children 
were born there. 
Demographic behaviour 
Age at first marriage 
This population married relatively late, and the female age at marriage re-
mained fairly high. 
The comparison with the Roubaix families studied by Chantal Pétillon sug-
gests that the Tourquennois married at a about the same age than the Roubai-
siens between 1820 and 1829. The men who married between 1859 and 1868 
were about a year younger and the women a year and a half older. However, 
the women’s age at marriage dropped steadily in Roubaix after that date, 
whereas the men’s age remained relatively unchanged (Pétillon 2006: 175). 
The situation in the two towns were therefore comparable. The distribution of 
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the spouses according to their age at marriage (figure 1) is without surprise: the 
men almost never married before 20, and rarely after 35, and women married 
mostly between 20 and 30. 
Tab. 1: Age at first marriage 
  Men Women 
First cohort 25.0 25.4 Complete and incomplete 
unions only 
Second cohort 28.8 23.7 
 
Fig. 1: Age au mariage, selon le sexe et la cohorte 
 
Fertility 
The first cohort is composed of relatively large families, and the majority of 
women bore children until their early forties. However, six children in twenty 
years is below natural fertility rates. The second cohort is interesting, because 
the average number of children had dropped by almost two, and fewer than one 
woman in five had a child past age 40. The age at last birth also dropped sig-
nificantly, from 39 to 34. A last child at 34 suggests that couple deliberately 
stopped having children. 
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Tab. 2: Average number of children; completed families 
 N No 
chil-
dren 
Average 
Number 
of chil-
dren 
Average 
age of 
the 
mother 
at the 
last birth 
% of 
women 
who did 
not have 
children 
past 30 
% of 
women 
who had a 
child at 40 
or later 
Cohort I 47 3 6.4 38.9 8.5 63.8 
Cohort II 70 2 4.7 33.9 18.6 20.0 
 
The fertility rates have been calculated in terms of the women’s age at mar-
riage and duration of unions (measured in five year periods). Fertility was more 
a matter of the length of union than of the woman’s age. The first cohort’s 
fertility graph lines are still slightly convex. The second cohort’s on the other 
hand are clearly concave (figure 2 and 3). As the numbers of completed fami-
lies are small, I also calculated the fertility rates of all women, eliminating the 
children born during truncated groups of periods of marriage (figures 4 and 5). 
The graphs have the same overall profile: the demographic behavior of those 
women during their shortened conjugal life was about the same as the one of 
the other women. However, one should not over-generalize. In neither cohort 
were all couples behaving in identical ways. Next to very small families that 
clearly reflect deliberate attempts at limiting the number of their children, there 
were others who as clearly were letting nature run its course. However, the 
proportion of the latter diminished. Large families were getting less common 
(see figure 6). 
Was high fertility a characteristic of the grande bourgeoisie, of those 
« families that set the tone » as Daumas called them? Determining who those 
leading families were is not easy. I used two criteria. The first one is the value 
of the assets they brought into marriage (but as mentioned earlier, the data is 
available only until 1865). Those whose dowries were above average were 
kept. The other criterion is ownership of a spinning mill. Spinning was the first 
phase of textile production to mechanize. Spinners were also the most likely to 
built integrated industrial complexes, combining different phases of production. 
Spinners were genuine captains of industry, and among the pioneers of the 
industrial revolution in the area. They were not the only dynamic entrepre-
neurs: carpet makers, wool combers, industrial dyers, machine builders, manu-
facturers of chemicals also had to keep up with technological changes in their 
trade, but they are much fewer in number and thus less useful for our purpose. 
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Fig. 2: Fertility rates – completed families 
first cohort 
 
 
Fig. 3: Fertility rates – completed families 
second cohort 
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Fig. 4: Fertility rate – all families 
first cohort 
 
 
Fig. 5: Fertility rate – all families 
second cohort 
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Fig. 6: Distribution of families, by number of children 
 
 
There were only 8 complete families among members of the first cohort 
who had above average dowries, and 12 among the spinners. The wealthy 
families could be of any size (1, 1, 3, 5, 5 6, 11, 13 - average 5.6). The spinners 
on the other hand had an average of 9 children; all the women, except two had 
their last child at 41 or more. The second cohort includes 14 wealthy complete 
families and 12 completed families headed by spinners (two belong to both, 
whereas there had been no overlap among the first cohort). The behaviour of 
the wealthy couples is almost identical to the one of the entire cohort. The main 
difference is the age at marriage: those people marry slightly earlier, especially 
the men: 25.3 for the man and 22.3 for the women. The women have their last 
child on the average at 33.9, and they have an average of 5 children. Their 
lower age at marriage alone could explain their additional child (or rather frac-
tion of child). The spinners on the other hand differ more from the rest of the 
cohort. The women marry at an even younger age (21.8). The men are slightly 
younger than the second cohort’s groom, but older than the wealthier men 
(26.7). The women have their last child at a slightly older age (34.7). This 
lengthening of their reproductive life (by 3 years) allows them to have two 
more children than the average (6.6). Nonetheless this occupational category 
follows the general trend; in the second cohort, they have fewer children than 
their counterparts in the first cohort, and they have the last child earlier. 
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Tab. 3: Characteristics of wealthy families and spinners’ families 
 – second cohort 
 N Age at 
mg. men 
Age at 
mg. 
women 
N 
children 
Age 
women 
at last 
birth 
Couples with assets at 
marriage exceeding 
40 000Fr  
14 25.3 22.3 5.0 33.9 
Spinners 10 26.7 21.8 6.6 34.7 
All complete families 84 28.8 23.7 4.7 33.9 
 
Are spinners more “representative” of the more dynamic segment of the in-
dustrial bourgeoisie? Did industrial modernity and larger families go hand in 
hand? It would probably be premature to reach this conclusion. To begin with, 
a 12 member cohort is very small. If we remove from it the one family that had 
14 children, all the averages are similar to the one of the entire second cohort. 
Secondly, one can find very small families among very dynamic entrepreneurs. 
The Flemish Felix Vanoutryve had the largest manufacture of upholstery mate-
rial in Tourcoing in 1882 (700 power looms), and had no reason to be envious 
of the Dewavrin or Desurmont spinning mills7. His only child, a son, married 
into a leading family, the Masurel, in 1884. The Binets are another case in 
point. Adolphe Binet operated the largest wool combing mill in town in 1882 
(39 machines). After his death, his five children (four sons, one daughter) 
turned the firm into a société en commandite (limited liability partner-
ship)called Les fils de A. Binet, and in 1896 were the first Tourcoing industrial 
family to transform their firm into a share holding society, the « Peignage de la 
Tossée », which lasted till the beginning of the twenty first century. This firm 
was heavily capitalized (3 millions of Francs). In 1896, it included a wool 
combing plant, a soap making factory, and also manufactured chemicals. Nei-
ther Vanoutryve, nor Binet had large families. It would therefore be imprudent 
to assume natalism was a necessary component of industrial capitalist men-
talité. It does not go without saying that creating children and new factories 
went hand in hand.  
                                                             
7  I have used the year 1882 as the base of comparison, because the majority of the grooms 
from the industrial middle class so not appear in the business tax rolls after their marriage, 
but a good fifteen years afterwards. It may have been customary for a father to provide his 
son with a factory when he married, but this does not seem to have included the deed to the 
property.  
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End of the century 
Our second cohort married in the middle of the century. Pétillon and Smith’s 
work suggest that family size increased at the end of the century, or at the be-
ginning of the twentieth. It is not yet possible to use civil registry data to verify 
whether this was true of the Tourcoing industrial bourgeoisie. However, the 
census allows us to determine the direction of the general trend. To do so, I 
collected the census data on all manufacturers (as defined above) on the 1881 
and 1911 census. Next, I estimated the marriage age of the mother, and the 
duration of marriage using the age of the eldest child listed (age of eldest + 1 = 
estimated duration of marriage; census age of mother less estimated length of 
marriage = estimated age at marriage). The results are of course approxima-
tions: the real eldest may have died or left home already. The latter possibility 
is however less likely in the case of couples married 20 years or less. Then, I 
calculated the average number of children for each category. Here again, the 
results are approximations: dead children are not listed, and infants may have 
been sent to a wet nurse. This phenomenon was not insignificant: the age dis-
tribution of this subpopulation reveals a significant deficit of infants under one 
year8 . Nonetheless, the average number of children of women who had been 
married married for 10-20 years and were aged 35-45 is 4.7. Those are the 
women who correspond to our second cohort. They are also the ones least 
likely to have an infant at the wet nurse, and most likely to have all their sur-
viving children still living at home. The census appears than to provide us with 
reliable data, especially for women towards the end of their reproductive life. 
Tab. 4: Distribution of children of manufacturers living with their parents 
1881 census 
Age <1 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 Total 
N 27 207 280 216 179 97 1006 
% 2.7 20.6 27.8 21.5 17.8 9.6  
1911 census 
Age <1 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 Total 
N 33 198 256 258 184 78 1007 
% 3.3 19.7 25.4 25.6 18.3 7.7  
                                                             
8  If we assume children under one should represent at least 1/5 of all the children under five, 
it is obvious that a lot of infants are missing: they represent 11% of the 0-5 cohort in 1881 
and 13% in 1911. 
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Tab. 5: Average number of children living with their parents, according to 
the age of the mother at marriage and the length of union – 1881 
Estimated length of union Estimated age at 
marriage  <5 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 Number 
of couples 
in 
category 
15-19 - 2.7 4.7 6.8 6 - 20 
20-24 1.5 2.7 3.7 4.7 4.8 4.1 134 
25-29 1.4 3.7 4 4.6 5 3 71 
30-34 1 2.8 4.2 2.5 2.5 3.7 26 
35-39 - 2 2 2 3.2 2 12 
40-44 - - 1 - 1 - 3 
Average accord-
ing to estimated 
length of union 
1.5 3.0 3.8 4.7 4.3 3.6  
Number of cou-
ples in category 48 58 54 43 45 18 263 
Tab. 6: Average number of children living with their parents, according to 
the age of the mother at marriage and the length of union – 1911 
Estimated length of union Estimated age at 
marriage <5 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 Number 
of couples 
in 
category 
15-19 1.5 2.7 3.8 3 1.7 2 25 
20-24 1.3 3 3.9 4.9 4.7 3.3 149 
25-29 1.5 2.4 4.4 3.1 4.7 3.7 82 
30-34 1.5 2.5 1.8 4.2 2.7 2 36 
35-39 1 2 - - 2.3 1.3 14 
40-44 - 1 0 1 3.8 3.0 6 
Average accord-
ing to estimated 
length of union 
1.4 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.0  
Number of cou-
ples in category 
39 48 43 51 36 20 306 
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Average numbers of children according to estimated age at marriage were 
diminishing for all subgroups, but especially among women married for 15-19 
years. (After 20 years of marriage, one should expect that women had fewer 
children at home). In 1881, the women married for 15-19 years had an average 
of 4.7 children; in 1911, this average had fallen to 3.8, and the number of chil-
dren at home leveled off after 10 years of marriage. These results do not sup-
port the thesis of a fertility rise at the beginning of the twentieth century. In-
stead, they suggest an increasingly “Malthusian” behaviour characterized by a 
constant lowering of the age at last birth. The trend uncovered in section IV 
appears to have continued to World War One. 
Catholics and malthusians?  
The results above do not allow us to conclude that manufacturers had more 
children at the end of the nineteenth century than at the beginning; neither do 
they allow us to conclude fertility was high but stable. In this socio-economic 
category, women had fewer and fewer children, and ceased to bear them at a 
younger and younger age. How can one reconcile those findings with this 
group’s Catholicism? Is Catholicism not tantamount to large families?  
In fact, the Catholic Church has never been particularly natalist, even if 
some claiming to obey its pronouncements pretended that God wanted couples 
to have as many children as possible. Their reasons were usually more political 
than theological. One thinks for instance of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Quebec Clergy, bent on a “Revenge of the cradles”, and threatening 
women who did not have a child every other year with hell and damnation; or, 
closer to our topic, the French Right at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
especially after the Great War (Thébaud 1985; Reggiano 1996). In both cases, 
one had to outbreed the enemy (Anglo-protestants or Germans). The Assem-
blées générales des catholiques du Nord-Pas de Calais on the other hand paid 
scant attention to neo-Malthusianism. They addressed the issue only three 
times between 1905 and 1912. In 1905 and 1906, neo-Malthusianism was 
discussed within the framework of a session on “public immorality” (Comptes 
rendus 1905: 343). The 1909 meeting paid it hardly more attention, despite its 
theme being “the family”, and a day devoted to the “enemies of the family” and 
to the ways of fighting them. During the morning session, neo-Malthusianism 
was depicted as one of the offspring of Free-masonry. In the afternoon, it reap-
peared among a long list of threats: free love, divorce, births out of wedlock, 
prostitution, absence of testamentary freedom, “rights of children” theory, bad 
books, alcoholism, and factory work. Neo-Malthusianism was never discussed 
on it own, and it seems that the presenters were more scandalized by the tech-
niques advocated by the neo-Malthusians (which “filled the hospitals with 
victims”) than by their results (Comptes rendus 1909: 312, 338, 350). The 1909 
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meeting clearly shows that the Catholics of the Nord-Pas de Calais, and the 
clergy that guided them were more preoccupied with the quality of the little 
Catholics than with their numbers.  
The Church condemned the use of “artificial” contraceptive as well as with-
drawal (Stengers 1971: 406). It had never disapproved mutually agreed absti-
nence. Saint Augustine had said that once the desired number of children was 
achieved, couples should cease all sexual activities. Periodic abstinence had 
been endorsed by the Sacrée Pénitencerie as early as 1880 (Noonan 1986; 
Stengers 1971). Unfortunately, as scientists did not know when a woman’s 
fertile was, the results left a lot to be desired. Later, the Church did not con-
demn the (more effective) Ogino method either (Smulders 1933; Noonan 
1986). It was therefore possible to limit the size of one’s family and remain a 
good Catholic as long as one did not use methods condemned by the Church.  
How did our couple reduce their fertility? The sources say absolutely noth-
ing about this; those were not topics one discussed in public. They could follow 
Saint Augustine’s injunction and stop having sex altogether (Brundage 1987: 
89-90). Individuals who had been taught since puberty to distrust their sexual-
ity, to view physical attraction to another person as a sign of moral weakness, 
and who had been admonished repeatedly to aspire to “purity” can very well 
have put an end to their sexual activity with relief, whatever their sex. They 
were no longer torn between their nature and their sense of morality. With-
drawal was another option. It was condemned by the Church, but in France, the 
hierarchy enjoined priests not to ask questions (Stengers 1971: 424, 426, 438-
48). It was better not to inform the husbands that the practice was prohibited, 
and let them engage innocently in it. Otherwise, there was a chance they would 
refuse to put an end to it, consciously sin, and stop coming to confession 
(Stengers 1971: 458-459; Noonan 1986: 401-403)9. Husbands who did not 
want to know could therefore easily not know and use withdrawal in all inno-
cence. There were then means to limit fertility, and continue to think one was a 
good Catholic. 
                                                             
9  This is the concept of « good faith » reasserted as late as 1892 in P. Berthier’s Abrégé de 
théologie moral et dogmatique: »Si le mari est dans la bonne foi, du moins au sujet de la 
gravité de son acte, il vaut mieux que la femme s’abstienne d’user de conseils et de prières 
qui, en voulant le détourner de son forfait, lui en révèleraient la gravité » (If the husband is 
in good faith at least as to the seriousness of his actions, it is better that the wife refrains 
from using of advice and prayers which, attempting to steer him away from his misdeed, 
would alert him as to its seriousness). (1892: 595 quoted by Stengers (1971: 454; also see 
Noonan 1986: 401-403). The confessors’ silence led couples to believe that all was permis-
sible within marriage, and the more widespread this belief was, the more confessors feared 
to ask questions (Stengers 1971 : 458-459). 
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Why limit births?  
One could attribute the behaviour of the Tourcoing manufacturers to some 
Zeitgeist: Natality had been dropping in France since the beginning of the nine-
teenth century (and in some parts of it, since the eighteenth). However, broad 
trends should not lead us to overlook causes specific to the region or to this 
particular socio-economic group. Other factors can have played a role: the 
decline in infant mortality, the overall enrichment of this group, and the emer-
gence of real firms, in the sense of entities capable of surviving the death of 
their owner. 
Infant mortality 
The fertility decline was paralleled by an equally significant drop in infant 
mortality. The first cohort women (complete and incomplete families) gave 
birth to 455 live and 6 dead children (still birth = 3.4% of all births). 65 of 
those children (14.3%) are known to have died before their first birthday, and 
another 57 between their first and fifth birthday (12.5%). Therefore at least one 
quarter of the children do not celebrate their fifth birthday. Second cohort 
women gave birth to 498 live and 8 dead children (1.6%). 33 died before their 
first birthday (6.7%) and an additional 34 before the fifth, which means only 
13.5% of the children are known to have died before age five. Wet nursing 
makes the figures for the death of children under one uncertain. However, the 
figures for the other two groups (still birth and 1-4) decline in the same propor-
tion. Women in the second cohort were twice less likely to deliver a dead child, 
and probably twice less likely to loose a child in the first five years of his or her 
life. 
It is difficult to determine if women had fewer children because they lost 
fewer or the reverse, and the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. The 
local practice to give the next child of the same sex the names of the one who 
had died can suggest that the death of a young child could lead to a replace-
ment pregnancy. Couples then may have had fewer children because they were 
surviving more; they wanted to have a predetermined number of children, and 
when they reached this number, they stopped – but may have another one if 
they lost one while the wife was still fertile. And if we adjust the number of 
children born to women of the two cohorts to account for the mortality of in-
fants and young children, we find that first cohort couples survived 4.8 children 
to age five, and second couple cohort 4.1. The gap between the final complete 
family size of the two cohorts has narrowed. 
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Gentrification 
Secondly, after the middle of the century, the manufacturers were no longer 
born to craftsmen, merchants and wealthy farmers like most of their parent and 
grandparents. They were also considerably richer, and indulged in a lifestyle 
appropriate to their income. More and more had servants. In 1820, 13.4% of 
the manufacturers’ households listed in the table of population had one servant, 
and none had more than two. In 1881, 73% had at least one, 24% had 2 and 2% 
more than two. In 1911, 65% had at least one, 22 % had two and 12% had more 
than two. When the servants were more numerous, they were more specialized, 
and suggest rather high living, if not gentrification. In 1881, the only coachmen 
were found in the household of a brewer, and were more likely to be brewery 
workers. The only governess, a middle aged French woman, was living with 
Denis Frys, a widower with eight children. On 1911, 20 households (out of 
460) had at least one of the following: chauffeur, coachman, wet-nurse, English 
or German governess, chamber maid, valet, gardener and concierge. Most of 
those households belonged to Tourcoing Gotha. The industrialist Jules Dasson-
ville and his wife had a one year old baby, a child’s nurse, a cook, a chamber 
maid, a chauffeur – and a car. George Desurmont, another industrialist had six 
children age 5 to 18, a valet, a cook, a chamber maid and a German governess. 
The widowed Felix Vanoutryve lived “alone” with a valet, a chamber maid, a 
cook, a gardener and a janitor. Three quarter of those twenty households had 
three children or less, and the age of the heads does not explain the size of their 
family. Were wealth and family size inversely proportional? 
We can try to answer that question by comparing industrialists with the 
members of the socio-economic group from which they emerged at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century: the craftsmen, merchants and traders. This is a 
more geographically mobile population than the manufacturers and industrial-
ists, and following them in the civil registers after mid-century would be prob-
lematic. I used systematic samples from three census years: 1851, 1886 and 
1911 (one in five for 1851 and 1886 and one in 20 for 1911)10. The details of 
the samples are found in table 7. 
                                                             
10  The first two samples had been collected for previous studies about Tourcoing hence the 
use of 1886 instead of 1881. 
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Tab. 7 
 1851 1886 1911 
sample size 1 in 5 1 in 10 1 in 20 
Total number of households in sample 1062 1145 920 
Total number of individuals in sample 5345 5555 3382 
Average household size in sample 5.0 4.9 3.7 
Number of households headed by a crafts-
man or trader 155 242 136 
% crafstmen and traders 14.6 21.1 14.8 
 
The three cohorts are noticeably different. In 1851, women who had been 
married at least fifteen years did not have more children than those married 10-
15 years. In 1886, they did (but their numbers are very small). The ones mar-
ried for less than 20 years had about the same number of children as contempo-
rary manufacturers’ wives in the same categories. The difference between 1886 
and 1911 is more pronounced. In 1911, women had fewer children no matter 
how log they had been married or what age they had married than the ones in 
the previous cohorts. They also had significantly fewer children than their 
better off distant cousins. If wealth led to smaller families, it was obviously not 
the only factor, and petty bourgeois couples had even fewer children. 
Tab. 8: Average number of children by age at mg and duration of mg-1851 – 
wife under 50 only 
Estimated duration of mg Estimated age 
at mg 
<5 5-<10 10-<15 15-<20 20-<25 N of 
couples in 
category 
15-19 1 3 3.5 3 2.7 9 
20-24 1.4 2.6 4.3 5.5 8.5 28 
25-29 1.6 2.6 4 3 3.6 31 
30-34 1 3.0 2.5 2.5  11 
35-39 2 2 4.5   6 
average 1.4 2.6 4.0 3.6 4.3   
N of couples in 
category 16 21 24 14 10 85 
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Tab. 9: Average number of children by age at mg and duration of mg-1886 – 
wife under 50 only 
Estimated duration of mg Estimated 
age at mg 
<5 5-<10 10-<15 15-<20 20-<25 24-<30 N of 
couples in 
category 
15-19 1.5 1.75 4 3.5 7 4.5 13 
20-24 1.7 2.7 4.3 5.1 8.3  46 
25-29 1.6 3.3 3.4 4.4 5.3  40 
30-34 1.9 2.5 5 3   7 
35-39 1      2 
40-44  2.5     2 
average 1.6 2.8 4.0 4.5 6.9 4.5  
N of 
couples in 
category 
25 28 29 19 7 2 110 
 
Tab. 10: Average number of children by age at mg and duration of mg-1886 
– wife under 50 only 
Estimated duration of mg Estimated 
age at mg 
<5 5-<10 10-<15 15-<20 20-<25 24-<30 N of 
couples in 
category 
15-19 1  1.5 1.5 3  7 
20-24 1 1.7 2.9 3 4.5 3 33 
25-29 1  2.3 3.4 3.4  21 
30-34 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.75   12 
35-39  1     1 
40-44 1      1 
average 1.1 1.8 2.5 2.9 4 3  
N of 
couples in 
category 
10 11 19 19 14 2 75 
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A third factor may explain the demographic behaviour of the Tourcoing 
middle class: the changes in the organization of production. As Patrick Verley 
stated « Le nombre élevé des enfants aurait pu apparaître comme un élément 
d’émiettement du patrimoine par les successions et donc de dissolution de 
l’identité de l’entreprise. »11. In this region, the Civil Code requirements of 
equal inheritance continued similar pre-revolutionary practices dictated by the 
Custumals (customary law codes). Many children then threatened the survival 
of the firm. According to Verley, large families had a choice between two 
alternatives. One was « le maintien du patrimoine en indivision dans une entre-
prise unique évoluant … vers une forme de société de capitaux dépersonnali-
sée» 12 . The other was the « modèle Motte ». Among the Motte of Roubaix and 
among those who adopted their solution « le développement se fit par généra-
tions d’entreprises nouvelles qui réalisaient l’intégration au niveau du groupe 
familial» 13. The problem described by Verley was however one that emerged 
in the second half of the century. Until the Second Empire, there were families 
engaging in a range of business activities in Tourcoing, rather than forms. 
Doing business at the beginning of the century required little capital, and the 
bulk of it was not tied into buildings and machines, but consisted in stock and 
commercial paper, and social capital (reputation of the name, personal con-
tacts) and know how were important. Social capital is unlimited. Merchant 
traders, and to a lesser extent out-putters in the 1830 and 1840s could establish 
a rather large number of children without excessive difficulties, especially in a 
context of rapid industrial growth. In the course of the century, the families 
who conducted businesses became families with a business, and soon families 
owning a factory. Once family fortunes derived from the possession of facto-
ries immobilizing larger and larger amounts of capital, strategies had to change. 
One could no longer launch children in life with a thousand francs and a good 
name. To give each son his own firm, it was better not to have too many of 
them, even if they could incorporate, like the Binet. Too few children however 
could also be a problem. What if the only son had no talent for business, and 
the daughter resisted marrying solely to provide her father with a successor. 
One needed a heir and a spare (or two), and as factories could support more 
than one family, there was no reason not to do so. Only the smallest businesses, 
the craft shops and the retail stores, could not support more than one family, 
and interestingly enough, the petty bourgeoisie had the smaller families at the 
end of out period.  
                                                             
11  “A large number of children could have appeared to be a factor facilitating the fragmenta-
tion of the patrimony through inheritance, and thus threatening the identity of the firm”. 
12  “The keeping of the patrimony in a jointly owned firm leading to an impersonal holding 
society.” 
13  “Development took the form of generations of new firms which were integrated into a 
family conglomerate” (Verley 1994: 77; also see Bonte 2002: 45-46). 
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Conclusion 
The case of the Tourcoing middle-class shows that Catholicism was not in-
compatible with attempts at limiting family size. The relatively low age of 
mothers at last birth suggests that once the optimal number of children had 
been reached, couples stopped having children. By the later part of the century, 
this optimal number was easier to reach because fewer children died young. 
Religious faith could however have slowed down the fertility decline: The 
petty middle class had even fewer children than their betters, and if they were 
similar to their colleagues in Lille, their religion was tepid or non existent. 
Religion however is unlikely to be the sole, or even the main explanation for 
the demographic behaviour of the middle class. Economic factors obviously 
played an important role. Better off couples could afford to raise more children, 
were in a better position to establish them, and were able to leave an inheri-
tance that could support more than one or two descendents. Family firms could, 
and were, co-owned and managed, and later in the century, could be turned into 
share holding societies. The petty middle class on the other hand contracted 
(1886-1911) after a period of growth (1851-86). In the period of expansion, this 
socio-economic category appears to have had more children (unless they sur-
vived more infants). They responded to subsequent reduced opportunities for 
their children to follow on their footsteps by having fewer of them. Beliefs 
could not trump parental caution. 
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